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Abstract 
This paper investigates the short-term overreaction to specific events and whether 
stock prices are predictable in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). We find evidence 
of the short-term overreaction in the EGX. Losers (“bad news” portfolios) signifi-
cantly outperform winners (“good news” portfolios) and investors can earn abnor-
mal return by selling the winners and buying losers. Terrorist attacks have negative 
and significant abnormal returns for three days post event followed by price rever-
sals on day four post event. Whereas, the tensions in the Middle East region have a 
negative and significant abnormal returns on event day followed by price reversals 
on day one post event. Moreover, the formation of a new government has no effect 
on the average abnormal returns post event in the EGX. The results also show that 
small firms tend to have greater price reversals compared to large firms. Overall, our 
results provide evidence of the leakage of information in the EGX.   
   
JEL classifications: G14 
Keywords: Overreaction hypothesis; Price reversal; Emerging markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Stock markets anomalies have long been examined in the literature, e.g., overre-
action and long-term price reversals (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985), short-term trends 
or momentum (Jegadeesh and Titaman, 1993), and excessive volatility of stock prices 
(Shiller 1981). De Bondt and Thaler (1985) were the first to empirically examine the 
overreaction hypothesis in finance. They built on the reasoning of Dreman (1982) 
and detect a new stock market anomaly based on the Kahneman and Tversky (1974) 
theory of representativeness. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that price reversals 
can be predicted using past return data (3-5 years) in case of systematic price over-
shoot. They formulate two main testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that 
“large stock price movements will be followed by price reversals in the opposite direction” 
(the directional effect of Brown and Harlow, 1988) and the second hypothesis is that 
“the larger the initial price movements the greater the subsequent reversals” (the magni-
tude effect). This suggests that stock returns exhibit negative serial correlation over 
long horizons and therefore investors may earn abnormal returns by exploiting this 
long-term mispricing, which is clearly inconsistent with the weak-form of market 
efficiency.  
 
George and Hwang (2007) argue that systematic mistakes of irrational investors 
in responding to new information are the main interpretation of the overreaction 
hypothesis. They claim that the theory of biased self-attribution of Daniel et al. (1998) 
may explain these mistakes. Therefore, investors may interpret and react differently 
to the new information, which leads to two contradictive investment behaviors: price 
continuation or price reversals.  
 
The existing literature has extensively investigated the overreaction phenomenon 
in developed markets, but only few studies have focused so far on the overreaction 
to specific events.1  The overreaction to specific events in emerging markets has, to 
                                                           
1 See, for instance, Seyhun (1990), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Zivney et al. (1996), Larson 
and Madura (2001), Kadiyala and Rau (2004), and Edmans et al. (2007). 
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the best of our knowledge, not been empirically examined yet. A question therefore 
arises as to whether stock returns are predictable as a result of specific events in 
emerging markets and if so what is the portfolios’ optimal holding period? This pa-
per tries to fill this gap using data from the Egyptian stock exchange (EGX).  
 
The EGX has become one of the biggest and most promising emerging markets in 
the Middle East and North Africa region, having grown substantially since the be-
ginning of the Egyptian economic reform and privatization program in mid-1990s. 
During the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 the Egyptian economy achieved a re-
markable real GDP growth rate of 7.2% in 2007 and 4.2 % in 2008, whilst some lead-
ing developed economies languished with negative or zero growth. As a result, 
Egypt was chosen by the Economic Reform Forum of the World Bank to be among 
the seven best countries in the world in undertaking effective steps for economic re-
form and enhancing the investment climate.2  
 
Following the methodology of Cox and Peterson (1994) and Larson and 
Madura (2003), the present paper examines the short-term overreaction to four major 
events, namely, terrorist attacks, the formation of new government, tensions in the 
Middle East region, and the announcement of the privatization of a state-owned en-
terprise (SOE). Using data for 100 listed firms with no price limits on the EGX over 
the period 2003-2009, we find evidence of short-term overreaction suggesting that 
losers (bad news portfolios ) significantly outperform winners (good news portfo-
lios) over the event window and that investors can earn abnormal returns by selling 
winners and buying losers. Terrorist attacks have negative and significant abnormal 
returns for three days post event followed by price reversal. Positive and significant 
abnormal returns are reported in day five post event. Tensions in the Middle East 
region have negative and significant abnormal returns on event day followed by 
price reversals on day one post event. Moreover, the formation n of new government 
                                                           
2 For more details, see, the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) statistics in 2009 and 2010. 
Some institutional factors distinguish the Egyptian stock market from other emerging mar-
kets such as the relatively low regulations and the absence of taxes on dividends and capital 
gains. 
Page 4 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
4 
 
has no effect on the average abnormal returns post event in the EGX.  The results 
also show that small firms tend to have greater reversals compared to large firms in 
the post event period. This result is consistent with the literature of the overreaction 
phenomenon (e.g., Cox and Peterson, 1994; Farag and Cressy, 2010). The results also 
provide evidence of the leakage of information in the EGX.   
 
Our results have important policy implications. First, they provide clear evidence 
of stock market imperfection. Investors can, therefore, earn abnormal return by ex-
ploiting the overreaction anomaly. Second, to the extent that the regulatory authori-
ties seek to raise the level of market efficiency in emerging markets to improve mar-
ket liquidity, exploring market imperfections works as an early warning system to 
the regulator.  
 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of 
the literature. Section 3 briefly describes the dataset. Section 4 details the economet-
ric approach. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes and con-
cludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
The existing literature has extensively investigated the overreaction phenome-
non in developed markets.3 Few studies have addressed short-term overreaction in 
emerging stock markets. Farag and Cressy (2010) investigate the short-term overre-
action and the disposition effect in the EGX over the period 2005-2008. They argue 
that the existing literature ignores time dimension in the analysis and this may lay 
the estimation open to bias due to firm heterogeneity. Using a panel data model, 
they find that the fixed effect model best suits the EGX data and that unobservable 
factors play an important role in explaining the overreaction phenomenon. Their 
results support the disposition effect as past losers outperform past winners. 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Zarowin (1989), Atkins and Dyl (1990), Bremer and Sweeney (1991), 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Liang  and Mullineaux  (1994), Park (1995), Schnusenberg 
and Madura (2001), Cox and Peterson (1994), Fama (1998), Larson and Madura (2003), Ma et 
al. (2005); Spyrou et al. (2007), and Lobe and Rieks (2011).  
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The overreaction to specific events has also been examined in the past literature. 
Zarowin (1989) investigates the overreaction to earnings phenomenon in the United 
States. He creates a trading rule based on firms that experience good earnings (win-
ners) and bad earnings (losers). All listed firms which have seven consecutive years 
of earnings (six years preceding the event and the current earnings year) are in-
cluded in the sample over the period 1971-1981. The results show that the oorest 
earnings portfolio outperforms the best earnings portfolio by 16.6% over the test pe-
riod due to the differences in firm size, which does not provide support to the hy-
pothesis of overreaction to earnings. Seyhun (1990) studies the trading behavior of 
the insiders in the NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ equity markets around the October 
1987 stock market crash. The author finds evidence that supports the overreaction 
hypothesis during the crash as insiders became heavy buyers after the crash so that 
extreme losers became winners over the three years subsequent to the crash.  
 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) examine the overreaction /underreaction of fi-
nancial analysts to earnings announcements of 178 firms over the period 1976-1986. 
They find evidence of analysts’ underreaction to earnings announcements rather 
than overreaction and conclude that extreme earnings forecasts by analysts cannot 
be explained by the overreaction hypothesis. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) investi-
gate the reaction of stock prices to common factors and firm-specific information in 
the US. They find evidence of underreaction to the stock market common factors and 
significant evidence of market overreaction to firm-specific information.  
 
Zivney et al. (1996) investigate the market overreaction to takeover rumors in the 
United States by examining over 2000 articles of takeover rumors published in the 
Wall Street Journal over the period 1985-1988. They find negative abnormal returns 
one year post takeover rumors, and thus conclude that the buy-on-rumors strategy is 
not profitable. However, they recommend that selling short subsequent to rumors 
100 days after the rumor day earns 20% cumulative annual abnormal returns. Larson 
and Madura (2001) look at the short-term overreaction in the foreign exchange mar-
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ket. They empirically analyze the effect of extreme one-day exchange rate adjust-
ments on a sample of developed and emerging markets. They find evidence of inves-
tor underreaction in the industrial economies, and overreaction in the emerging 
economies.  
 
Kadiyala and Rau (2004) investigate the overreaction/underreaction towards 
four main corporate events in the United States, namely, cash and equity financed 
acquisition, share buyback and equity offerings. They find that the announcements 
of corporate events after good news (i.e., positive earnings surprise) outperforms 
those events after bad news announcements (i.e., negative earnings surprise) apart 
from the information convoyed in the corporate event. Edmans et al. (2007) analyze 
the relation between sudden changes in investors’ mood and stock returns. They 
find significant negative abnormal returns (-7% monthly) as a result of market reac-
tion to losses by national football teams, especially in western European countries. In 
addition, they find weak evidence of market reaction to international cricket, rugby, 
and basketball international competitions. They argue that investors may earn ab-
normal returns by selling short the futures on market indices before major sport 
events in western European countries. Vergin (2001) finds evidence of price overre-
action to the outstanding performance in the U.S. National Football League (NFL) 
games compared to the previous 2-5 games in the United States between 1981 and 
1995.  
 
3. Data 
To examine the short-term overreaction hypothesis in the EGX, daily data of 
stock prices and EGX30 market index are used for 100 listed stocks with no price lim-
its on the EGX.4 We limit our sample period to 2003-2010 since 2011 onwards corre-
                                                           
4 To protect investors – especially small investors – from extreme volatility in prices, the 
EGX trading regulations initially (in February of 1997) maintained a 5% ceiling/floor restric-
tion over a stock’s price compared to its closing price in the last trading session. However, as 
the Egyptian stock market subsequently developed the need to remove or relax price con-
trols became imperative. On 21 July 2003, the EGX commenced a new price ceiling system, 
whereby the daily price limit was widened to +/-20 %. To ensure market fairness and inves-
tor protection, if any of the stocks weighted average price exceeded +/-10 % from its open-
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spond to a large political instability period following the Arab spring uprisings 
characterized by many discontinuous trading periods. 
 
We define the event as the sets of firms experiencing a one-day price rise (Win-
ners) or fall (Losers) of at least 10% as the result of the following events: (A) - terror-
ist attacks; (B) - tensions in the Middle East region; (C) - privatizations of a SOE; and 
(D) - formation of a new government. We use the EGX 30 index, a free floated mar-
ket capitalization weighted index, to represent the Egyptian stock market benchmark 
as in Farag and Cressy (2010). Data are collected from the EGX and the Egypt for 
Information Dissemination (EGID), which provides online services about EGX listed 
firms.  
 
Following Cox and Peterson (1994) and Farag and Cressy (2010), the estimation 
period for betas is [-105, -6] and the test period is [+1, +120] days as compared with 
the event day. We use the market model as a benchmark to measure the abnormal 
returns with betas estimated for each firm over the 100 days prior to the event.5  
 
4. Econometric modeling 
We use the event study methodology to estimate the abnormal returns during the 
test period. Following the methodology of Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and Cox and 
Peterson (1994), we begin by defining daily returns. 
Daily returns  
The return variable tR is defined as the first difference in the natural logarithm of 
the closing price over two consecutive trading days:  
 1−−= ttt PLogPLogR                                                                              (1) 
where tp  is the closing price of the stock in day (t) adjusted for dividends, rights is-
sue, and stock split.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ing price during the trading session, the trading would be halted for half an hour. When the 
session is resumed, if the stock’s weighted average price exited the 20 % band, trading on 
this stock would be halted until the end of the session. 
5 The CAPM and market adjusted abnormal return are also used as alternative models to 
estimate the abnormal return. The results remain qualitatively the same. 
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Stock abnormal returns 
Stocks’ abnormal returns in the test period are defined as the residuals of the 
market model.  
 TtRRAR mtiiitit .....,2,1,0, =−−= βα                  (2) 
                                                                                              (3)  
where T = 120 days, iα  and iβ  are the OLS estimates of the market model pa-
rameters for firm (i) estimated over the estimation window. itR and mtR are the firm (i) 
and market returns for period (t), respectively.6 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
 Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) are then calculated as follows: 
∑
=
=
t
iit ARCAR
1τ
τ                                                                                              (4) 
ICARCAAR
I
i
itt /
1
∑
=
=                                        (5) 
where I = 100 stands for the number of stocks in the sample. 
We use the t-test statistic to examine whether or not there is a significant differ-
ence in CARs between winners and losers for a given day within the event window 
as follows: 
∑
=
−−=
=−
n
at
t
tt
nAARARARS
ARSARstatt
1/)()(
)(/
2
                                                              (6) 
where S is the standard deviation of the stock’s abnormal returns.  
 
Cross-sectional regression 
Following previous studies including Cox and Petersen, (1994), Farag and 
Cressy (2010), Larson and Madura, (2003), and Ma et al. (2005), we estimate the fol-
lowing cross-sectional model by regressing cumulative abnormal returns CARi 
against initial abnormal returns in event day ARi0, firm size, and a dummy variable 
                                                           
6  We also use the symmetric GARCH and asymmetric TARCH models to estimate the ab-
normal returns and to control for serial correlation in return time series following Benou and 
Richie (2003) and obtained similar results.  
jtmtjjjt RR εβα ++=
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representing firm ownership.7 In addition, we include the Leaki variable (cumulative 
average abnormal returns for three days before the event date) that captures the 
leakage of information and the effect of insider information as a proxy for market 
inefficiency (Larson and Madura, 2003). Moreover, we include a dummy variable 
(Ownership) as a proxy of firm ownership to indicate whether or not the firm is state-
owned before the IPO. This is consistent with the Egyptian economic reform pro-
gram started in 1997; as number of SOEs is floated into the Egyptian stock exchange 
through IPOs.  
100,......1ln 43201 =+++++= iOwnershipLeakmcapARCAR iiiiii εββββμ         (7) 
 
where 100/
120
1
∑=
=t iti
CAARCAR . 0iAR  is the initial abnormal return in event day (t=0). 
Ownership is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm was privately held 
before IPO and a value of 0 otherwise. lnmcapi is the natural logarithm of the free 
floated market cap of firm i one day before the event. Leaki is cumulative average 
abnormal returns for three days before event date as a proxy for the leakage of in-
formation. iε is a white noise error term for stock i. 
 
5. Empirical results 
The descriptive statistics for the four events are presented in Table 1. The sample 
includes 100 firms over 120 days as test periods. The initial one-day abnormal return 
on event day (ARi0) for the losers’ events (A and B) are -5.60% and -3.17%, respec-
tively. However, the initial abnormal return on event day for the winners' events (C 
and D) is 7.11% and 6.52%, respectively. Cumulative abnormal return (CARit) over 
the same event window (120 days) for the losers are 14.59% and 7.46 % for events A 
and B, respectively, and for the winners are -20.52% and -35.19% for events C and D, 
respectively. This suggests that buying losers on average not only earns positive ab-
                                                           
7 Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the free float 
one day before the event to mitigate potential endogeneity problems. 
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normal returns over the period following the event but also outperforms the winner 
portfolios.  
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns three days before the event as a proxy for 
the leakage of information (Leak) are 1.07% and -0.12 % for the losers’ events A and 
B, respectively, and are 0.66% and -0.56% for the winners events C and D, respec-
tively. Average firm size proxied by market capitalization for the losers are 312 mil-
lion (A) and 354 million (B) Egyptian pounds, respectively, whereas the average firm 
size for the winners are 370 million (C) and 326 million (D) Egyptian pounds, respec-
tively. Finally, half of the sample was formerly SOEs before the IPO. 
 
“Insert Table 1 about here” 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the v riables associated with each of 
the four events. The reported correlations show that there is no potential multicollin-
earity since all correlations are lower than 0.50. 
 
“Insert Table 2 about here” 
 
Table 3 presents the average abnormal returns and t-statistics for the losers and 
winners over event window [–5; +5]. It is clear that both losers and winners have, as 
expected, highly significant abnormal returns on event day (p value < 0.001).  
For event A (Terrorist Attacks), we notice positive abnormal returns pre event (-4 
to -1 days), which may indicate investors’ optimism and herding behavior. The aver-
age abnormal return on event day is negative -5.61% and highly significant at less 
than 0.1%. We also notice that the effect of event A continues (price continuation 
phenomenon) for the subsequent three days post event, as the average abnormal 
returns are negative and highly significant at the 5% level. Price reversal occurs on 
the fourth day where positive and highly significant abnormal returns are found on 
day 5.  
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With regard to event B (Tensions in the Middle East), the average abnormal return 
on the event day is negative -3.17% and highly significant at the 1% level. However, 
price reversal occurs on day 1 post event as we notice a positive abnormal return on 
day one post event (1.35% significant at the 5% level). There is no leakage of infor-
mation, as insignificant abnormal returns are found over the five days before the 
event B.  
“Insert Table 3 about here” 
 
Figure 1 shows the results of plotting cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) over time, for the losers over one week pre- and post-events. The overreac-
tion is clear from figure 1 as stock price reversal of event B occurs on day 1 post 
event while the price reversal of event A occurs in the fourth day post event.  
 
“Insert Figure 1 about here” 
 
The winners have highly significant positive abnormal returns (7.11% and 6.52%) 
on the event day for events C (The privatization of a SOE) and D (The formation of 
the new government), respectively. Price reversal occurs on day 1 post event for both 
events. We also notice positive and significant abnormal returns for event C on day 1 
preceding the event, which is synonym of a leakage of information effect. Figure 2 
shows the results of plotting CAARs over time, for the winners over one week pre- 
and post-events.  
 
We conclude that positive and significant abnormal returns can be achieved as 
the result of terrorist attacks in the fifth day post event. However, the tensions in the 
Middle East region have negative and significant abnormal returns on event day fol-
lowed by price reversals on day one post event. Furthermore, although we find posi-
tive and significant abnormal returns on day 0 as the results of the privatization of a 
SOEs and the formation of a new government, we notice that there is no significant 
average abnormal returns post events. To summarize, these findings are consistent 
with the literature on overreaction phenomenon as past losers (bad news) outper-
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form winners (good news) in the sense that investors may achieve abnormal returns 
by selling winners and buying losers.  
 
“Insert Figure 2 about here” 
 
Table 4 reposts the CAARs for losers and winners over the different periods to al-
low better assessment of the optimal holding period for the winners and losers.  
With regard to event A, we see that the CAAR pre-event window [-5, -1] is positive 
and highly significant, which implies herding behavior and investors’ optimism. 
Highly significant negative abnormal returns are reported in the following day due 
to the terrorist attack as shown in Table 3. CAAR [+21, +50], and [+51, +120] win-
dows have positive and abnormal return at the 5% level. The optimal holding peri-
ods are [+21, +30], [+51, +60], and [+41, +50] as the CAARs are 4.40%, 3.89%, and 
3.72%, respectively. However, the optimal holding period for event B is [+31, +40], as 
the cumulative average abnormal returns is 5.36%. The findings support the argu-
ment that past losers outperform past winners. The optimal selling period for the 
winners events (C) and (D) are [+41, +50], and [+71, +80], respectively in views of 
positive CAARs during these periods.  
       
“Insert Table 4 about here” 
 
Figures 3—5 show th  patterns of CAARs for winners and losers over the 120-day 
period post events. It is clear from the figures that past losers outperform past win-
ners, which enables the investors to achieve abnormal returns by selling winners and 
buying losers (the disposition effect). These results are therefore consistent with the 
literature on price reversal (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). Similar results are found by, 
among others, Cox and Petersen (1994), Larson and Madura (2003), Ma et al. (2005), 
and Farag and Cressy (2011).  
“Insert Figure 3 about here” 
“Insert Figure 4 about here” 
“Insert Figure 5 about here” 
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         Table 5 presents the results of a cross sectional OLS regression of Eq. (7). The 
dependent variable is the CAR over 120 days post event. It is clear that the models 
are reasonably well specified since the F statistics are highly significant for both the 
winners’ and losers’ specifications. The average adjusted R-squared is 23.29% and 
22.63% for the losers and winners, respectively. The negative sign of lnmcap as a 
proxy for firm size suggests the small firm effect, as small firms tend to have greater 
reversals compared with large firms in the post-event period. This result is consis-
tent with the literature of the overreaction phenomenon (e.g., Cox and Peterson, 
1994; Farag and Cressy, 2010). More interestingly, we find positive and significant 
influence of the leakage of information with regard to events A and D. Furthermore, 
privately-held firms before IPOs have greater CARs than the SOEs for both losers 
and winners, except in the case of event D.   
“Insert Table 5 about here” 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The existing literature has extensively investigated the overreaction hypothesis, 
but only few studies have addressed the overreaction to specific events. In this pa-
per, we examine the short-term overreaction to four main events that may affect 
stock returns. These events include the terrorist attacks, the tensions in the Middle 
East region, privatization of a SOE, and the formation of new government. We par-
ticularly tackle the question of whether or not stock prices are predictable in the 
EGX. We use daily price data from the EGX on a sample of 100 listed firms that ex-
perienced dramatic one-day price change as the result of the considered events over 
the period 2003 to 2010 and finds evidence of short-term overreaction in the EGX. 
Bad news portfolios are found to significantly outperform good news ones over the 
event window, suggesting that investors can earn abnormal return by selling win-
ners and buying losers.  
Moreover, terrorist attacks have negative and significant abnormal returns for 
three days post event followed by price reversal as positive and significant abnormal 
returns are reported in day five post event. However, Tensions in the Middle East 
region have negative and significant abnormal returns on event day followed by 
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price reversals on day one post event. Moreover, the formation of a new government 
and the privatization of SOEs have no effect on the average abnormal returns post 
event in the EGX. We also provide evidence that small firms tend to have greater 
reversals compared to large firms in the post event period. This result is consistent 
with the prior literature on the overreaction phenomenon. Finally, we find evidence 
that supports the presence of the leakage of information in the EGX.   
Overall, the findings of our paper provide clear evidence of stock market imper-
fection, which signals the invalidation of the weak-form market efficiency. Investors 
can thus earn abnormal return by exploiting the overreaction anomaly. Typically, 
since the short selling strategy is not widely used in the Egyptian stock market, in-
vestors may adopt a trading strategy consisting of buying event-exposed shares at 
the end of each trading day and selling it at the end of the following trading ses-
sion(s). Similar conclusions are reached by Brown et al. (1988) and Lob and 
Rieks (2011). As to policymakers, they would need to implement institutional and 
regulatory reforms to improve the level of market efficiency and liquidity.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard  
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A: Event A (Terrorist attacks) 
itCAR  0.1459 0.5331 0.8378 3.5184 
0iAR  -0.0560 0.0305 -0.9938 5.4384 
Lnmcap 19.557 2.1201 -0.2359 3.4275 
Leak 0.0107 0.0364 0.3326 3.9305 
Ownership 0.5000 0.5051 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel B: Event B (Tensions in the Middle East) 
itCAR  0.0746 0.4560 0.8879 4.2309 
0iAR  -0.0317 0.0515 2.4385 5.3944 
Lnmcap 19.684 1.6846 0.1821 2.4302 
Leak -0.0012 0.0619 -3.9771 2.3192 
Ownership 0.5000 0.5051 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel C: Event C (Privatization of a SOE) 
itCar  -0.2052 0.6675 0.2085 6.1621 
0iAR  0.0711 0.0389 1.3019 4.4327 
Lnmcap 19.731 1.8593 -0.3922 3.6710 
Leak 0.0066 0.0422 0.9448 4.0901 
Ownership 0.5000 0.5051 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel D: Event D (Formation of a new government) 
itCar  -0.3519 0.5917 -0.3775 2.7186 
0iAR  0.0652 0.0312 1.86134 6.0601 
Lnmcap 19.604 1.3670 0.1102 2.3783 
Leak -0.0056 0.0417 -2.1486 3.1620 
Ownership 0.5000 0.5051 0.0000 1.0000 
100/
120
1
∑=
=t iti
CAARCAR . ARi0 is the initial abnormal return in event day (t=0). Ownershipei is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm was privately held before IPO and a value of 0 otherwise. 
lnmcapi is the natural logarithm of the free floated market cap of firm i one day before the event. Leaki is 
cumulative average abnormal returns for three days before event date as a proxy for the leakage of in-
formation. iε is a white noise error term for stock i. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 Lnmcap ARi0 Leak Ownership 
Panel A: Event A (Terrorist attacks) 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARi0 -0.0388 1.0000   
Leak 0.0040 -0.1455 1.0000  
Ownership 0.1262 -0.2257 -0.2555 1.0000 
Panel B: Event B (Tensions in the Middle East) 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARi0 0.0146 1.0000   
Leak 0.1174 -0.0589 1.0000  
Ownership 0.4507 0.2362 -0.0816 1.0000 
Panel C: Event C (Privatization of a SOE) 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARi0 -0.1087 1.0000   
Leak 0.2641 0.3422 1.0000  
Ownership 0.2989 -0.0848 -0.0007 1.0000 
Panel D: Event D (Formation of a new government) 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARi0 0.0014 1.0000   
Leak 0.0562 -0.1267 1.0000  
Ownership -0.1532 -0.0597 0.1030 1.0000 
100/
120
1
∑=
=t iti
CAARCAR . ARi0 is the initial abnormal return in event day (t=0). Ownershipi is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm was privately held before IPO and a value of 0 oth-
erwise. lnmcapi is the natural logarithm of the free floated market cap of firm i one day before the 
event. Leaki is cumulative average abnormal returns for three days before event date as a proxy for 
the leakage of information. iε is a white noise error term for stock i. 
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Table 3: Average abnormal returns for the losers and winners 
 Losers Winners 
 Event A 
(Terrorist attacks) 
 
Event B 
(Tensions in the 
Middle East) 
Event C 
(Privatization  
of a SOE) 
Event D 
(Formation of a 
new government) 
 AR t-stat. AR t-stat. AR t-stat. AR t-stat. 
-5 0.0076 1.5545 0.0164 3.6968*** -0.0082 -1.6781* -0.0139 -3.8321*** 
-4 0.0132 3.2188*** 0.0036 0.9181 -0.0076 -1.6032 -0.0021 -0.5180 
-3 0.0057 1.6057** -0.0021 -0.4622 -0.0015 -0.2217 -0.0065 -1.8253* 
-2 0.0071 1.8626* 0.0013 0.2268 0.0016 0.3584 -0.0038 -0.6696 
-1 0.0107 2.0852** -0.0012 -0.1316 0.0165 2.0974** -0.0155 -0.9416 
0 -0.0561 -12.9808*** -0.0317 -4.351*** 0.0711 12.9446*** 0.0652 14.7585*** 
1 -0.0102 -2.0736** 0.0135 2.3198** -0.0019 -0.2682 -0.0045 -0.7875 
2 -0.0027 -2.0399** 0.0071 1.4715 -0.0042 -0.6728 -0.0141 -2.4994** 
3 -0.0029 -2.0098** 0.0027 0.6223 -0.0023 -0.4373 -0.0027 -0.6476 
4 0.0009 0.2347 0.0004 0.1173 0.0015 0.2596 0.0029 0.6588 
5 0.0076 2.8693*** 0.0019 0.4245 0.0044 0.7254 0.0024 0.4093 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 4: Cumulative average abnormal returns for the losers and winners over the event window 
 Losers Winners 
 Event A 
(Terrorist attacks) 
 
Event B 
(Tensions in the 
Middle East) 
Event C 
(Privatization of a 
SOE) 
Event D 
(Formation of a new 
government) 
 CAAR t-stat. CAAR t-stat. CAAR t-stat. CAAR t-stat. 
CAAR[-5, -1] 0.0442 4.3367*** 0.0182 1.0320 -0.0091 -0.6260 -0.0318 -2.2355** 
CAAR [+1,+3] -0.0103 -1.3035 0.0232 2.4000** -0.0084 -0.8859 -0.0213 -2.5359** 
CAAR [+4, +10] -0.0202 -1.5722 0.0096 0.6974 -0.0207 -1.2872 -0.0130 -0.8731 
CAAR [+11,+20] -0.0258 -1.5302 0.0286 1.7410* -0.0364 -1.8625* -0.0744 -4.8753*** 
CAAR [+21,+30] 0.0440 2.6806** -0.0214 -1.7046* -0.0284 -1.6095 -0.0297 -2.8938*** 
CAAR [+31,+40] 0.0129 0.8168 0.0536 3.3828*** -0.0044 -0.2696 -0.0119 -0.8013 
CAAR [+41,+50] 0.0372 2.1367** -0.0003 -0.0159 0.0175 1.0686 -0.0105 -0.7185 
CAAR [+51,+60] 0.0389 2.2478** 0.0037 0.3419 -0.0277 -2.7228** -0.0282 -2.0974** 
CAAR [+61,+70] 0.0181 1.1175 -0.0015 -0.1280 -0.0138 -0.7880 -0.0333 -2.5463** 
CAAR [+71,+80] 0.0258 1.5835 -0.0121 -0.9497 -0.0222 -1.5291 0.0001 0.0027 
CAAR [+81,+90] 0.0191 1.1156 0.0156 0.8437 -0.0168 -0.9501 -0.0173 -1.0317 
CAAR [+91,+100] 0.0085 0.5045 -0.0073 -0.5856 -0.0216 -1.8115** -0.0242 -1.2570 
CAAR [+101,+110] -0.0140 -0.6897 -0.0072 -0.5663 -0.0336 -3.0108*** -0.0348 -2.3560** 
CAAR [+111,+120] 0.0089 0.4647 -0.0090 -0.7796 0.0116 1.2655 -0.0567 -4.9903*** 
CAAR [+21,+50] 0.0941 3.1020*** 0.0319 1.0002 -0.0153 -0.4314 -0.0521 -1.9923* 
CAAR [+51,+120] 0.1053 2.1986** -0.0178 -0.4985 -0.1240 -2.6274** -0.1945 -3.2825*** 
CAAR [+1,+120] 0.1455 1.9336* 0.0737 1.1440 -0.2022 -2.1365** -0.3736 -4.2565*** 
  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 5: Cross Sectional Regressions 
 Losers Winners 
Dependent vari-
able CAR 
Event A 
(Terrorist attacks)     
 
Event B 
(Tensions in the 
Middle East) 
Event C 
(Privatization 
of a SOE) 
Event D 
(Formation of a 
new government) 
Independent variables   
C 1.2342** 
(0.5963) 
1.7719** 
(0.7581) 
1.9500* 
(1.0102) 
1.1827 
(1.1555) 
Lnmcap -0.0665** 
(0.0319) 
-0.1042*** 
(0.0410) 
-0.0988* 
(0.0501) 
-0.0174 
(0.0575) 
Leak 0.4020*** 
(0.0721) 
-0.9480 
(1.1972) 
-2.9608 
(2.2338) 
4.5557** 
(1.8844) 
ARi0 2.6280 
(2.3067) 
-2.9834** 
(1.4622) 
-5.2833** 
(2.3474) 
0.7006 
(2.5030) 
Ownership 0.4371*** 
(0.1438) 
0.3391** 
(0.1453) 
0.3517* 
(0.1747) 
-0.4660*** 
(0.1568) 
Adj R2 0.2265 0.2394 0.2315 0.2211 
F.stat 4.5868** 3.8202*** 4.6895*** 3.3522** 
100/
120
1
∑=
=t iti
CAARCAR . ARi0 is the initial abnormal return in event day (t=0). Ownershipi is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm was privately held before IPO and a value of 0 otherwise. lnmcapi is the natural 
logarithm of the free floated market cap of firm i one day before the event. Leaki is cumulative average abnor-
mal returns for three days before event date as a proxy for the leakage of information. iε is a white noise error 
term for stock i. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors 
are between parentheses. 
 
Page 23 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
23 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative average abnormal returns for events A and B 
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Figure 2: Cumulative average abnormal returns for the events C and D 
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  Figure 3: CAARs for the Events A and B over event window 
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Figure 4: CAARs for the events C and D over the event window 
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Figure 5:  CAARs for all events 
 
 
 
